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Where to With Stare Decisis?
F. R. AUMANN*
Today there is a spirit of change abroad in the land. It is
present on every hand. Nowhere it is more apparent than in
the legal field, where thoughts and work about law and its
place in society have assumed a new vitality. Indeed some
students of legal phenomenon believe it to be a period of major
significance. Dean Pound has described it as one of the great
periodic swings back to justice without law.1 Judge Joseph C.
Hutcheson looks upon it as one of the greatest periods of re-
vival for the judiciary and the law in several centuries. "We
are now in fact," he says, "in the bursting time of one of law's
long, slow but greatly glorious springs. I look for a great
flowering. '2
In the schools a movement has arisen, variously described,
which puts emphasis on what courts do. Some speak of this
movement as "a scientific approach to law"; others as "the
skeptical movement," or the "neo-realist" movement; while
still others describe it as "the functional approach" which
stresses the interest in, and valuation by, effects. The "objective
method" and "fact-research" are looked upon as having an
important place in this movement and interest in the actuality
of what happens is emphasized, and distrust of formula is ex-
pressed. Although the individuals who have taken part in this
movement differ somewhat in point of view, in interest, and in
emphasis, certain points of departure seem common to all.3
Karl Llewellyn believes any such common approach would
involve: "(i) The conception of law in flux, of moving law,
and of judicial creation of law; (2) the conception of law as a
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.
1 "Justice According to Law," 13 COL. L. REv., 696 (1913).
2 "Judging as Administration," 7 AMERICAN LAw SCHOOL REV., 1071
(934).
3 "Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound," 44
HARv. L. REv., IZ2 (1931).
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means to social ends and not an end in itself; so that any part
needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its
effect and to be judged in the light of both and of their relation
to each other; (3) the conception of society in flux, and a flux
typically faster than the law, so that the probability is that any
portion of law needs re-examination to determine how far it fits
the society it purports to serve; (4) the temporary disregard-
ing of the question of what the courts ought to do, while en-
gaged in the study of what the courts are doing; (5) distrust
of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they purport to
describe what courts or people are actually doing; (6) distrust
of the theory that prescriptive rule-formulations are the
heavily operative factors in producing court decisions. This
involves the tentative adoption of the theory of rationalization
for the study of opinions; (7) the belief in the worthwhileness
of grouping cases and legal situations into narrower categories
than has been the practice in the past; (8) an insistence on
evaluation of any part of the law in terms of its effectsi (9) in-
sistence on sustained and programmatic attack on the problems
of law along any of these lines." 4
Accompanying this realistic movement in jurisprudence is
a tendency to put a new emphasis on the r6le and importance
of the judge in orienting law to life.5 In this view, it is the duty
of the judge to administer law, "not merely possessively, but
dynamically and actively"; adapting the law to changing social
S"Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound," 44
HARV. L. REv., 1222 (193).
5 "In such times judging is administration, and the actual and the ideal
draw close in the law. When I say then, that there is nothing modern in what
I am to say, this must be taken as true only in a restricted sense. Though the
idea that judging is the administration of justice according to law is very old,
there is, in the acute awareness of today of the need for, and the meaning of
a functional approach in judging as in everything, a real modernism." (Italics
mine). "The Worm Turns," 27 ILL. L. REv. 357 (1932); Stone, "Some As-
pects of the Problem of Law Simplification," 23 COL. L. REv. 319 (923);
Wigmore's inimitable critique on judges and their ways, 5 Wigmore, Evidence
(second Ed. 1915), Preface to Supplement Index; Judge Joseph C. Hutche-
son, Jr., "Judging as Administration," 7 AMER. LAW SCHOOL REv. 1071
(1934).
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needs' so far as possible through the judicial process; and where
the law is lacking anywhere and beyond the judicial power of
repair, to co-operate with judicial councils and, their agencies
in getting change through other channels.'
Emphasis on a conscious recognition of the factor of social
control in the judging process is greatly favored by the realists.
It has some interesting sidelights.8 It is in line with the prag-
matic philosophy now so widely accepted.9
""Now it is commonplace to say that the functional approach of the
judge to his work in administering justice is perhaps more important than the
methodic; that in short a judge must in discharging the great office to which
he is called, conceive his function in dynamic terms. Everywhere people are
inquiring, what are you doing? in order to know why are you doing it. Every-
where the predicate is being laid for more and better administration; prag-
matic idealists, idealistic pragmatists, are abroad in the law. They want to
know if what you are doing is working well. If not, why not scrap it. ("Func-
tionalism means thinking of effort in terms of what it is intended to accomplish
rather than what it is. This is where pure description fails. It sees a thing or
an effort as it is going rather than as it ought to be or ought to go or to be
or do the thing we want. This is the key to the new direction of effort; to
look at intended results and to survey all the possible means for their accom-
plishment regardless of the means which happen to be in use. For it may
very likely be that present means have been arrived at in some haphazard and
rule of thumb fashion rather than by an effort of genuine analysis." Tugwell,
The Industrial Discipline). It is almost as if there were a great wind blowing,
throwing open the shutters of our minds, dashing down old signs pointing
tabu there, and having opened the dosed and dark places, already sweeping
the dust and rubbish gathered there." Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., ibid.,
p. 1071.
7 F. R. Aumann, "The Ohio Judicial Council Embarks on a Survey of
Justice," 24 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 416 (1930); F. R. Au-
mann, "The Judicial Council Movement and Iowa," 15 IOWA L. REV. 425
(1930); F. R. Aumann, "The Ohio Judicial Council: Studies and Reports,"
27 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 957 (1933).
g Walter W. Cook's "Scientific Method and the Law," 13 AM. BAR Ass. J.
303 (1927); Herman Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," 14 AM. BAR
Ass. J. 71 (19z8).
9 "As a point of view, pragmatism may perhaps be best described as an
effort to take fully to heart the lesson of evolution, first as it appeared in the
work of Darwin, and then as a way of looking at all sorts of social phenomena.
Darwin's work was epoch-making in the history of thought, because it was the
first scientific achievement, on a vast scale, along the lines of a purely empirical
method such as English philosophy from the days of Francis Bacon had loved
to emphasize, namely the ordering of a great mass of seemingly unrelated data
without the clues of mathematics. But the results of evolution radically
changed the pre-Darwinian picture of nature and of human thought. It sug-
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In emphasizing the factor of control the realists do not deny
that "purpose has always been an inescapable factor in deter-
mining what shall be enforced as law" but stress the point that
the adaptation of means to an end ought to be self-conscious and
methodical, a recognized part of the jurists' problem."
Closely related to this tendency to give the judge an in-
creased or reemphasized responsibility" in the sphere of con-
gested a process of endless change, without fixed ends, in which the course of
change, could be plotted only for limited intervals and in terms of causal
relations having a rather limited span. It swept away the whole apparatus of
fixed categories of explanation such as the species of pre-Darwinian biology,
and reduced the so-called self-evident and a priori principles upon which both
science and philosophy had been supposed to rest to the level of "provisional"
rules. And if one asked "Provisional for What?", a generation that had
learned of Darwin could only answer, "Provisional for human action." Thus
it became natural to picture thought as a factor in behaviour, significant for
what it effectively does in modifying the habitual adaptation of men to the
conditions of their life. Thus philosophic pragmatism may be said to stand
like a tripod upon the three supports of empiricism, evolution, and the instru-
mentalism of thought in human behaviour. It accepts control as the end of
knowledge and the test of its efficacy, and therefore makes purpose an ineradi
icable part of all thinking." Geo. H. Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to
Politics," 24. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 865 (1930).
10 "The object of the law is to regulate conduct for some end, and the
end sought is the only criterion by which to decide what similarities are essen-
tial and what are not. The ruling consideration in making the choice ought
to be the desirability of the practical results which will follow. Consequently,
the jurist ought not to try to escape the consideration of ends and the means
of obtaining them, but should make such matters consciously and overtly a part
of his study of the law. As I understand Professors Cook and Oliphant, they
mean to assert that some choice of public policy cannot practically be avoided
by judges and students of the law. The objection is not that judges fail to
do this, but that they do it confusedly, or ignorantly, and therefore without a
full sense of responsibility for what they are doing. By setting up the fiction
that cases themselves contain the principles for their own classification, they
really become the victims of their own preconceptions. There is no system of
formal legal logic by which cases can validly be decided, and the pretense that
decisions are made in this way merely encourages clandestine ways of making
them." Geo. H. Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to Politics," z4 AttERICAN
POLITICAL SCIENCE REv. 865 (1930).
11 "Just as when communities go religiously dead, and revivals sweep
over them to make religion live again there, the religion when it comes is in
spirit though not in form, the same old religion, so ever recurring these stir-
rings in the law are not new; they are revivals, for the whole truth of the
matter is that in method law is ever changing. The function of its admin-
istrators to do justice is ever constant. What strictures and prevents the actual
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scious renovation, or judicial legislation, or judicial restatement
of the law, is a perceptible change of judicial attitude toward
the function of precedent in our system. At the present time
there are many indications that the doctrine of "stare decisis"
is undergoing a marked decline in its influence and practical
application in this country." Authority for this statement may
be found in many places.'3 We can turn to the utterances of the
from growing ever toward the ideal in the law, is administrative lack. Because
of this lack, form is taken for substance. Method becomes more important
than function. Predictability, certainty and fixity of line, rule and precept in
the law cease to be elements of, they become, law, transcending all other
elumunts in it, standing for the time for justice itself. As the law crystallizes
under this treatment, its ministers, the judges become administrators less and
lc, oracles, more and more. Then, in periods of change and revival, the
administrator appears again. Greatly conscious of his function he tumbles
down the pent house in which formalism has confined the law, and working
sometimes with old straw, sometimes with new, sometimes without straw at
all, he lifts the temples of the law higher toward the Heavens, where long
enough housed, its administrators cease again to be administrators, become
again diviners, patterers, soothsayers, lever shifters of legal slot machines."
Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., ibid., p. 1070.
1 There does not seem to be such a trend in England. Justice Cardozo
in comparing the position of the doctrine in this country and England said:
"The House of Lords holds itself absolutely bound by its own prior decisions."
Gray, supra, Sec. 462; Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 164, Sec. 64; Pound,
"Juristic Science and the Law," 31 HARv. L. REv. 1053 (1918); London
Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council, 1898, A. C. 375, 379. The
United States Supreme Court and the highest court of the several states over-
rule their own prior decisions when manifestly erroneous. Pollock, "First
Book of Jurisprudence," pp. 319, 32o; Gray, "Judicial Precedents," 9 HARV.
L. RE V. 27, 400 (895). Pollock in a paper entitled, "The Science of Case
Law," written more than fifty years ago, spoke of the freedom with which
this was done, as suggesting that the law was nothing more than a matter of
individual opinion. Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, p. 245. Since then
the tendency has if anything increased.--Cardozo, "The Nature of the
Judicial Process," p. 1 58. Arthur L. Goodhart gives a very reasonable explana-
tion as to why the doctrine of "Stare Decisis" is losing prestige in this country
and not in England. "Case Law in England and America," 15 CORNELL L.
Q. i89 (1930).
13 "In such matters we can only speak of averages, of tendencies. And it
is, I think, safe to say that in most American jurisdictions today a more rational
theory as to the binding force of precedents generally obtains than that held
by the British House of Lords. The very multiplication of authority tends to
impair to some extent its force, especially where the decisions in various juris-
dictions are inconsistent and conflicting. The better class of modern lawyers
and judges have in part from the very copiouness of authority come to regard
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courts;' 4 or we can turn to the pages of our leading legal publi-
cations and find indications of this changing attitude toward
stare decisis. Expressions from both Bench and Bar would leave
one to believe that a modification of the doctrine," if not its
complete abandonment, would find favor in many quarters."
These expressions do not come from unimportant persons
or places. Quite the contrary, they emanate from sources which
call for attention and respect from the legal profession in gen-
eral. Members of the United States Supreme Court,' the Su-
precedent as their servant and not their master, as presumptive evidence of
what the law is rather than as absolutely conclusive evidence."--Orin McMur-
ray, "Changing Conceptions of Law," 3 CALIF. L. REv. 441, 446 (1915).
14 In Washington v. Dawson and Co., 264 U. S. 21, z38, 44 Sup. Ct.
302, 309, (1904) Mr. Justice Brandeis cites twelve instances in which the
Supreme Court has ,reversed itself.
" Judge Cardozo says: "I think adherence to precedents should be the
rule and not the exception. . . . But I am ready to concede that the rule of
adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to be in
some degree relaxed. . . . There should be greater readiness to abandon an
untenable position when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably be sup-
posed to have determined the conduct of the litigants and particularly when
in its origin it was the product.of institutions or conditions which have gained
a new significance or development with the progress of the years."--Benjamin
Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, (1921) pp. 149, 150,
I51.
I" Professor Herman Oliphant takes a very advanced position in the mat-
ter. "Not the judges' opinions, but which way they decide cases will be the
dominant subject-matter of any truly scientific study of law. This is the field
of scholarly work worthy of best talents, for the work to be done is not the
study of such things as the accumulated wisdom of men taught by immediate
experiences in contemporary life,-the battered experiences of judges among
brutal facts."-"A Return to Stare Decisis" 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159, (1928).
17 "The Circuit Court of Appeals was obviously not bound to follow its
prior decision. The rule of "stare decisis," though one tending to consistency
and uniformity of decision, is not a question entirely within the discretion of
the court, which is called upon to consider a question once decided."--Mr.
Justice Lurton in Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212, 30 Sup. Ct. 6zi
(1910).
"Satisfied as we are that the legislation and the very great weight of
judicial authority which have been developed in support of this modem rule,
especially as applied to the competency of witnesses convicted of crime, pro-
ceed upon a sound principle, we conclude that the dead hand of the common-
law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied in such cases as we have here,
and that the ruling of the lower courts on this first claim of error should be
approved."-Mr. Justice Clark in Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 465,
471, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 150, (1918).
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preme Court of Kansas, 8 the Supreme Court of Ohio,' and the
New York Court of Appeals"0 are included in the list of those
persons who have expressed the view that the doctrine may and
should be modified when circumstances require it.
Members of the Bar and legal publicists who have expressed
the opinion that the doctrine should be modified to a greater or
lesser extent would make a distinguished company indeed. In-
cluded in its membership is a group of eminent law school
deans. Dean Roscoe Pound," Dean Henry H. Wigmore, 5
Dean Leon Green,23 Dean Orin MacMurray, 4 and Associate
Justice Harlan Stone of the United States Supreme Court,25
formerly Dean of the Columbia Law School. All of these men
have criticized the practice of following the principle of stare
decisis too closely. Dean Wigmore has been particularly em-
phatic in his criticism of the doctrine.
"8 "The doctrine of "stare decisis" does not preclude a departure from
precedent established by a series of decisions dearly erroneous, unless property
complications have resulted, and a reversal would work a greater injury and
injustice than would ensue by following the rule."-Thurston v. Fritz, 91
Kan. 625, 194, . In this case the Supreme Court of Kansas departed from the
common-law rule concerning dying declarations.
"I "A decided case is worth as much as it weighs in reason and righteous-
ness, and no more. It is not enough to say, 'thus saith the court.' It must
prove its right to control in any given situation by the degree in which it sup-
ports the right of a party violated and serves the cause of justice as to all parties
concerned."-Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, (Ioo Ohio St. 348, 351, 352,
126 N.E. 300, 301, 1919). In this case the court overruled a doctrine which
had been the law of Ohio since 18z5.
20 "In fact, there has been no objection raised anywhere to the right of
the wife to maintain the action for criminal conversation except the plea that
the ancient law did not give it to her. Reverence for antiquity demands no
such denial. Courts exist for the purpose of ameliorating the harshness of
ancient laws inconsistent with modern progress when it can be done without
interfering with vested rights." Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, i65,
14o N.E. 227, 230, (1923).
21 "Law in Books and Law in Action," (1904), 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 20;
"Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 COL. L. REv. 6o5, 614, (19o8). "Tho
Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 HARv. L. REv. 940-943 (1923).
2 2 PROBLEMS or LAw, p. 79. (1920).
23 "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," z8 COL. L. REv. 1014,
1036 (i9z8).
24 "Changing Conceptions of Law," 3 CALuF. L. REV. 440, 446 (1915)-
25 "Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification," z3 COL. L. REv.
319, 320 (1973).
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A group of able jurists, including Justice Clarke,26 Justice
Lurton" Justice Cardozo," Justce Pound,29 and Judge Von
Moschzsker, 9 have advanced somewhat similar ideas, as have
such distinguished lawyers as John W. Davis,3 and Findlay L.
Garrison.32 An equally impressive list of legal scholars and
publicists have taken a similar position. Included in this group
are Arthur L. Goodhart,33 Herman Oliphant, 4 and many
others.3"
In other words, there is a considerable body of legal opinion
in this country, emanating from respectable sources, which be-
lieves that a noticeable modification of the doctrine of stare
decisis is now taking place in our system. This relaxation of the
ancient dogma is looked upon by this group as a necessary and
wholesome tendency, one which should be encouraged to the
degree that it becomes necessary to adapt our law to the living
present.36 Indeed there are some who would go so far as to
predict a day when precedents, and especially the precedent of
26 Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 465, 471, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, Io
(1918).
27 Hertz v. Woodman, z18 U.S. 205, 212, 30 Sup. Ct. 62i (1910).
28 THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, (192) 149-151-
29 "Some Recent Phases of the Evolution of Case Law," 31 YALE L. J.
361, 363 (I9z3).
30 "Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort," 37 HARV. L. REV. 409, 413
(1924).
" "The Case for the Case Lawyer," 3 MAss. L. J. 99, 102, (1916).
32 "Blind Adherence to Precedence," 5i Am. L. REV. 251, 25Z, (1907).
13 "Case Law in England and America," I5 CORNELL L. Q. i86 (1930).
-4 "A Return to Stare Decisis," 14 A.B.A.J., 71, 159, (3928).
35 John Young, "Law as an Expression of Ideals," (1917) 27 YALE L. J.
1, 29; Edward B. Whitney, "The Doctrine of Stare Decilsi," (1904) 3
MICH. L. REV. 89, 94; Frederick G. McKean, "The Rule of Precedents,"
(.927) U. OF PA. L. REV. 481; Robert S. Hall, "Precedents and Courts,"
(1917) 51 AM. L. REV. 833; Thomas P. Hardman, "Stare Decisis and the
Modern Trend," (3926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. i65, i66; Clarence G. Skelton,
"The Common Law System of Judicial Precedent Compared with Codifica-
tion as a System of Jurisprudence," (1918) 23 Dicm. L. REV. 37; Samuel B.
Clarke, "What May Be Done to Enable the Courts to Allay the Present Dis-
content With the Administration of Justice," (1916) 5o Am. L. REv. 161;
C. E. Blydenbaugh, "Stare Decisis," (1918) 86 CENTRAL L. J. 388.
36 F. R. Aumann, "Judicial Law Making and Stare Decisis," 21 Ky. L. J.
156 (1933).
WHERE TO WITH STARE DECISIS 177
a single case, will no longer be considered a binding source of
law which judges must accept under all circumstances.
Whether we go that far or not, the tendency to relax the force
of precedent in our judicial process is bound to give the judge
a larger r~le in determining what the law is which shall be
applied." The ultimate outcome of this trend is difficult to
predict. In some quarters the belief is held that the final result
will be a condition approximating the civil law."
There are several practical factors which might bring about
such a result. For one thing, there is a growing demand for
speedy settlement of cases. At the same time the volume of
judicial business has continued to increase rapidly." With this
37 "Precedents, and especially the precedent of a single case, will no
longer be considered a binding source of law which judges must accept under
all circumstances. Only if decided cases have created a practice upon which
laymen have relied will the American courts feel that they are bound to follow
them. This, as I have attempted to show, is the doctrine of the civil law and
directly contrary to that of the English law with its insistence upon the need
for certainty. I therefore believe that, as concerns the fundamental doctrine
of precedent, English and American law are at the parting of the ways."
Goodhart, EsAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW, p. 74.
" Under the present system our judges have a difficult time in adjusting
the law to the rapidly changing social and economic conditions of the country.
"Where a rule has once been decided, even though wrongly, it is difficult or
impo:sible to depart from it. I do not agree with those who think that flexi-
ility is a characteristic of Case Law. The binding force of precedent is a
fetter on the discretion of the judge; but for precedent he would have a
much freer hand."-Geldart, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW, p. zS.
aa "It is, I think, therefore safe to say that the present American doctrine
is strongly away from the strict English doctrine of 'stare decisis.' But is this
merely a temporary step to be followed by the reaction which so frequently
succeeds legal innovations, or is it likely to be accentuated in the future? I
believe that the latter is the fact, and that in no distant time the American
doctrine will approximate the civil law. This will be due in large part to five
reacons: (a) the uncontrollable flood of American decisions, (b) the predom-
inant position of constitutional questions in American law, (c) the American
need for flexibility in legal development, (d) the method of teaching in the
American law schools, and (e) the restatement of the law by the American
Law Institute."--Goodhart, EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON
LAW, p. 65.
-1 "All available figures show consistent and large growth in the amount
of litigation." See GENERAL TRENDS IN VOLUME OF BUSINESS, RECENT
SocIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, Vol. 2, (933) pp. 1450-1453.
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increase has come an expansion of case law." In bulk it has now
become almost unmanageable.42 Some method of control must
be devised." Although there is some evidence that the courts
are trying to limit their written opinions, the problem remains
unsolved.4 One way to cut through this wilderness is to free
the judge from the demands of stare decisis.4 s
Whether any movement to modify the doctrine of stare
decisis would extend to the point of civil law practice is not so
clear. Whatever the final state of affairs may be, it would seem
safe to say that our judges are likely to enjoy a period in which
they will be given a much freer hand in determining the law,
unfettered by precedent. In other words, it would seem that
for a time at least, the scope of judicial law-making will be a
wide one.
Insofar as this tendency makes for flexibility in our regular
judicial tribunals it would seem to be highly desirable. As Dean
Pound,"8 Robert Jackson47 and a multitude of others have
41 "Each year about 350 volumes of reports are being published, which
can be compared with the five or six volumes for all of England and Wales.
As far back as 19o2 the President of the American Bar Association, in his
annual address to the Association, cited by Whitney, 'The Doctrine of Stare
Decisis,' 3 MICH. L. REV. 90, 97 (I904), stated that the law reports of the
past year contained z6z,ooo pages and estimated that a man by reading ioo
pages a day might go through them in eight years; by which time there would
be new reports on hand sufficient to occupy him for 56 years more." Goodhart,
EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW, (1931) p. 65.
42 "As to rulings of courts, it is estimated that in America alone there
are a million and a half reported decisions available as judicial precedents;
and the increase each year represents 170,000 printed pages." Root, Elihu,
ADDRESS TO AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LAW, Circular,
1929, No. 7, P- xo; Y. B. Smith, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, New York
State Bar Association Bulletin, 1930, pp. 189, 19o.
43 RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, Vol. 2, (933) P.
1430; see also Cardozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 1924, p. 4. "Unless
courts set some restraints on the length and number of published opinions, it
is inevitable that our present system of making the law reports the chief
repository of our unwritten law will break down of its own weight."
44 For the percentage of cases where written opinions were reduced in
U. S. Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals see Rosbrook, "The
Art of Judicial Reporting," 10 CORNELL L. Q. 103 (1925).
4- Objections are encountered from those who cling to what Morris
Cohen calls "the phonographic theory of the judicial function."
46 "Justice According to Law," 13 COL. L. REV. 696 (1913).
47 "An Organized American Bar," x8 AM. BAR Ass. J. 384 (1932).
WHERE TO WITH STARE DECISIS 179
pointed out, the modern demand is for executive justice as
oposed to judicial justice. The public wants speedy settlement,
finality and freedom from procedural contention. Hence it
ousts the regular courts and settles its problem through admin-
istrative agencies unhampered by technical rules of evidence.
The legalist on the other hand, has put great store by a
traditional set of values, such as separation of powers in gov-
ernment, the supremacy of an independent judiciary, proof of
every allegation according to time tried rules of evidence, test-
ing each witness by cross-examination, deliberation, jury-trial
and appeal. The legalist cannot forget that the history of
Anglo-Saxon political and legal institutions is the history of the
battles for these rights, despite the delay, technicality, and
expense which frequently accompany them. The conclusion is
obvious. If judicial justice is to retain its prerogative it must be
made more flexible. If relaxing the doctrine of stare decisis and
enlarging the discretionary role of the judge assists in this pro-
cess it should be so recognized and treated accordingly.
